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CHAPMAN v. COMMONWEALTH: DEATH ROW VOLUNTEERS, 
COMPETENCY, AND “SUICIDE BY COURT” 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2002 Marco Allen Chapman murdered seven-year-old 
Chelbi Sharon and her six-year-old brother, Cody.1  Chapman left for dead the 
children’s ten-year-old sister, Courtney, and their mother, Carolyn Marksberry, 
after stabbing each multiple times.2  Chapman was executed by lethal injection 
on November 21, 2008.3  However, no jury convicted him of the murders or 
sentenced him to death.  Rather, Chapman pleaded guilty to the murders, fired 
his attorneys, and requested the death penalty.4  His stated intent was to 
commit “suicide by court.”5 
Chapman was a death row volunteer, generally speaking, an inmate who 
chooses to forgo presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing or to waive 
appeals and collateral review in order to hasten execution.6  Outside the legal 
profession, this case may seem like an easy one—a man who savagely 
murdered two children while attempting to murder their entire family would 
prefer to accept his death sentence now rather than endure a decade or more on 
death row.  The state saves money on costly appeals, the victims and their 
loved ones are spared a lengthy courtroom battle, and justice is served without 
undue delay.  For scholars, practitioners, and students of our criminal justice 
system, however, the phenomenon of death row volunteerism poses a number 
of difficult questions.7 
 
 1. Brief for Appellee at 1–2, Chapman v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-70-MR, 2007 WL 
2404429 (Ky. Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Around the Nation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 22, 2008, at A10. 
 4. Mike Rutledge, Murderer Pleads, Wants Death, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1. 
 5. Brief for Appellant at 3, Chapman v. Commonwealth, No. 2005–SC–70–MR, 2007 WL 
2404429 (Ky. Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. 
 6. See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 164–85 (1991); see also Richard W. Garnett, 
Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
795, 796 & n.2 (March 2002) (describing the forms of death row volunteerism and the irony of 
the term). 
 7. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Killing the Willing, “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 940 n.5 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Anthony J. Casey, 
Maintaining the Integrity of Death:  An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to 
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Consider the following: Should courts allow capital defendants to abandon 
their appeals?  Or should the state’s interest in administering the death penalty 
reliably, even-handedly, and justly prevail over the defendant’s autonomy—his 
right to self-determination and the freedom to accept his punishment?  What 
remains of the adversary system when the goals of the defendant and 
prosecutor align with defense counsel on the other side?  How should defense 
counsel respond to an irreconcilable conflict between zealous advocacy and the 
client’s wishes?  Finally, who should be allowed to volunteer?  What is the 
standard for competency to volunteer, why do defendants choose to volunteer, 
and are these two inquiries related? 
In fact, Chapman’s case brings these tensions and competing concerns into 
sharper relief in that he “volunteered” before trial, waiving his right to have an 
impartial finder-of-fact decide his guilt or innocence or to determine his 
sentence.8 
This note will explore how Chapman’s case informs the current debate 
over death row volunteerism, emphasizing the discussion of competency in 
particular.  Part I is an overview of volunteerism, addressing the major issues 
and the basic arguments on each side of the debate.  It will also cover in depth 
the Supreme Court case that set the standard for competence, as well as some 
judicial and scholarly critique of that decision.  Part II is an account of the 
Chapman case including the factual and procedural history and an analysis of 
the Kentucky Supreme Court’s unanimous decision upholding Chapman’s 
death sentence.  Part III analyzes Chapman’s case in light of the current 
competency standard and in light of the criticism of the prevailing standard.  It 
asks whether a different, heightened standard is enough to satisfy opponents of 
volunteerism and concludes that such a revised standard is not.  Part III then 
explores procedural safeguards as an alternative to a modified competency 
standard.  Finally, Part IV touches briefly on the challenges that face 
opponents to volunteerism and concludes with an endorsement of minimal 
procedural safeguards courts should adopt to protect the integrity of the death 
sentence. 
 
Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 76 & 
nn.1–2 (2002) (citations omitted).  Both authors cite an early authority on death row volunteers.  
G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of 
Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 860–61 (1983).  Strafer wrote 
seven years after the Supreme Court re-imposed the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153 (1976), and was able to list each of the eight men who had been executed up to that point, 
five of whom were volunteers.  Id. at 860–62, 860 n.2.  Since 1977, 1123 men and women have 
been executed, 130 of whom volunteered in some capacity.  See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/searchable-database-
executions (For data on executions, click “Get Info;” for data on volunteers, then return and 
search “Volunteer” under “Special Factors” and click “Get Info”) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 8. See Rutledge, supra note 4. 
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I.  VOLUNTEERING AND COMPETENCE 
A. Death Row Volunteers: History & Issues 
Death row volunteerism is not a recent development.  Since 1976, when 
the Supreme Court reinstated states’ right to execute prisoners in Gregg v. 
Georgia,9 roughly twelve percent of all executions have been the result of 
volunteerism.10  In fact, Gary Gilmore, the first prisoner executed after the 
reinstatement of the death penalty, was an especially vocal volunteer.11 
Volunteers present the criminal justice system with a number of serious 
concerns which one commentator has divided into three basic areas: the 
competence of the volunteer, the stress it puts on the adversarial system, and 
the ethical problems of representing death row clients.12  The discussion on 
death row volunteerism arises from a philosophical divide,13 with those who 
oppose allowing death row inmates to circumvent the sentencing process or to 
waive appeals on one side,14 and those who support the condemned’s right to 
pursue or abandon his defense on the other side.15  It is worth noting, as one 
 
 9. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 10. According to the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), 1123 individuals have been 
executed since 1976, 130 of whom (or 11.6%) were volunteers.  See Searchable Database of 
Executions, supra note 7. 
 11. See Matthew T. Norman, Note, Standards and Procedures for Determining Whether a 
Defendant Is Competent to Make the Ultimate Choice—Death; Ohio’s New Precedent for Death 
Row “Volunteers,” 13 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 111–13 (1998–99) (summarizing the story of Gary 
Gilmore). 
 12. David A. Davis, Choosing Death: Florida’s Treatment of Death Row Volunteers, 40 
CRIM. L. BULL. 260, 262 (2004). 
 13. See Blume, supra note 7, at 948–54 (summarizing the debate over volunteering). 
 14. See, e.g., Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of 
Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 
55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment requires the presentation of mitigating evidence and recommending that 
courts appoint special counsel to present mitigating evidence when the defendant seeks to prevent 
defense counsel from doing so); Casey, supra note 7, at 101–05 (arguing that the state’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of the death penalty outweighs the individual inmate’s interest in 
controlling his own defense at the trial and sentencing stages). 
 15. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned 
Prisoners, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 582 (1984) (“After the State takes all possible 
precautions to avoid error [in imposing a death sentence] and at the same time protect the 
interests of society, the final decision on whether to pursue or terminate appeals should be left to 
one person—that person whose life is at stake.”); Julie Levinsohn Milner, Note, Dignity or Death 
Row: Are Death Row Rights to Die Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the 
Terminally Ill and the Terminally Sentenced, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
279 (1998) (analogizing terminally ill patients and death row inmates and concluding that death 
row inmates should have the right to waive sentencing and appeals subject only to a competency 
determination). 
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commentator has said, that “[p]erhaps not surprisingly, those who argue that 
death-sentenced inmates should not be permitted to waive their appeals are 
overwhelmingly opposed to the death penalty, while those arguing for a 
generous waiver standard are, on the other hand, almost always supporters of 
the death penalty.”16 
Opponents of volunteerism align with Justice Thurgood Marshall, who 
penned a series of dissents in death penalty cases17 articulating the major 
concerns that should prevent the state from allowing defendants to choose the 
death penalty.  In Lenhard v. Wolff, Marshall, an outspoken death penalty 
abolitionist,18 summarized these concerns: 
[T]he consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a 
State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment. . . . [T]he Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of 
individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual punishment, but . . . it also 
expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state authority is 
not used to administer barbaric punishments. 
  Society’s independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be overridden by a 
defendant’s purported waiver.  By refusing to pursue his Eighth Amendment 
claim, [the defendant] has, in effect, sought the State’s assistance in 
committing suicide.19 
Opponents of inmates’ right to volunteer often invoke the label “state-assisted 
suicide” and speak of the state’s vital interest in maintaining integrity and 
consistency in capital sentencing.20 
On the other hand, proponents of allowing inmates to waive appeals and 
volunteer speak equally often of respecting the autonomy of the inmate to 
choose his defense, or to choose to have his just punishment administered 
without undue delay.  Volunteering is not suicide because “society—through a 
jury or judge—has found the death penalty to be the appropriate punishment 
 
 16. Blume, supra note 7, at 952.  I should note here that I support the abolition of the death 
penalty.  However, so long as capital punishment endures, I do not oppose volunteering in all 
circumstances.  See infra Part IV. 
 17. See Blume, supra note 7, at 948 (quoting Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting), and adding “[t]hose who oppose a death-row inmate’s right to waive his 
appeals and submit to execution generally echo Marshall’s . . . objections”); Kristen M. Dama, 
Comment, Redefining a Final Act:  The Fourteenth Amendment and States’ Obligation to Prevent 
Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be Put to Death, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1083, 1089–90 
(2007).  (Discussing and quoting Marshall’s dissents in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 
(1976) and Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 171–72 (1990)). 
 18. See Lenhard, 444 U.S. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I continue to adhere to my view 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances.”). 
 19. Id. at 810–11 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 20. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 7, at 948–50. 
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for the defendant’s crime . . . .”21  Granting an inmate the right to volunteer 
preserves the convict’s dignity and humanity through self-determination, lest a 
just punishment be carried out in a cruel fashion.22 
Competence, which the next part will explore, is “squarely in the center of 
the debate”23  since opponents question whether an inmate can ever rationally 
choose to abandon his defense, and supporters point to the logic of a 
condemned person accepting his punishment without further delay.24 
B. Godinez: A Unitary Standard for Competence 
The standard for competence to volunteer for execution evolved by a “slow 
and fitful process,”25 settled, for now, by the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Godinez v. Moran.26  The Court held that due process requires precisely the 
same level of competence to stand trial with assistance of counsel as to plead 
guilty, waive right to counsel, and abandon appeals—that is, to volunteer.27  
The decision resolved a circuit split with the Ninth and District of Columbia 
Circuits requiring a different standard to plead guilty and dismiss counsel than 
to stand trial, and every other circuit applying the same standard to both.28 
Moran confessed to fatally shooting two people at a bar and killing his ex-
wife nine days later.29  Moran initially pleaded not guilty to three counts of 
first-degree murder, and was examined by two different psychiatrists, both of 
whom found him competent.30  Just a few months afterwards, Moran appeared 
before the court and expressed his intention to dismiss his attorneys and plead 
guilty.31  The trial judge then examined Moran at length.32  The judge advised 
Moran of the potential pitfalls associated with self-representation, questioned 
him regarding his understanding of the nature and consequences of his actions, 
and whether his decision was the result of any improper influences including 
drugs and alcohol.33  The trial judge was satisfied with Moran’s competence, 
and accepted his waiver of counsel and his guilty plea.34  Moran then declined 
 
 21. Id. at 952. 
 22. Id. at 951–52. 
 23. Id. at 953. 
 24. Id. at 950–53 (quoting C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and 
the Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 855 (2000)). 
 25. Blume, supra note 7, at 943 (citing Norman, supra note 11, at 122). 
 26. 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 27. Id. at 399–401. 
 28. Id. at 395–96, 395 n.5. 
 29. Id. at 391–92. 
 30. Id. at 391. 
 31. Godinez, 509 U.S at 392–93. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 392–93, 393 n.2. 
 34. Id. at 392–93. 
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to present any mitigating evidence or call any witnesses at his sentencing, and 
a three-judge panel sentenced him to death.35  The Nevada Supreme Court 
upheld his death sentence for the two victims in the bar, but reduced his 
sentence to life without parole for the murder of his ex-wife.36 
Moran later sought post-conviction relief, claiming he had been 
incompetent to plead guilty and represent himself.37  After the Nevada 
Supreme Court rejected this petition (and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari), Moran filed for habeas corpus in federal court.38  The District Court 
denied the petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.39  Relying 
on the Supreme Court’s two-paragraph opinion in Westbrook v. Arizona,40 the 
court found that “[c]ompetency to waive constitutional rights requires a higher 
level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial.”41  Due process 
required the trial court to hold a separate evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether Moran had “the capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives 
available to him,”42 not simply a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings, the standard for competency to stand trial since Dusky v. United 
States.43 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Circuit Court’s 
reliance on Westbrook misplaced.44  Westbrook did not require a higher or 
different standard for competence to waive right to counsel, but merely an 
additional finding by the trial court that the waiver was knowing and 
voluntary.45  Furthermore, the Court could discern no apparent difference 
between the Dusky standard of “rational understanding” and the Ninth 
Circuit’s putatively heightened “reasoned choice” standard.46  Defendants who 
plead not guilty and proceed with counsel are faced with choices as profound 
and grave as defendants who plead guilty and waive counsel, such as whether 
to waive the privilege against self-incrimination (by testifying), the right to 
confront accusers or trial by jury, and strategic choices such as “whether (and 
how) to put on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Godinez, 509 U.S at 393. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 389. 
 40. 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam). 
 41. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 265–66 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d Godinez, 509 U.S. at 
389. 
 42. Id. at 266–67. 
 43. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 44. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397. 
 45. Id. at 400–02. 
 46. Id. at 398. 
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defenses.”47  “If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not 
guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty,” and “there is no 
reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably 
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other 
constitutional rights.”48 
Thus, a defendant who seeks to plead guilty and dismiss his attorney is 
subject to a two-part inquiry.  First, the defendant must be found competent to 
stand trial under the Dusky standard or its reiteration in Drope v. Missouri: a 
defendant must have the “capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him, consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his 
defense.”49  Second, the defendant’s waiver of his rights must be knowing and 
voluntary.50  The trial court discharged its duty first by finding Moran 
competent to stand trial after evaluation by two psychiatrists and second by its 
explicit finding Moran was “‘knowingly and intelligently’ waiving his right to 
the assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were ‘freely and voluntarily’ 
given.”51  Due process did not require the trial court to hold an additional 
competency hearing unless it had reason to doubt Moran’s competence, which 
it did not52, because the standard is unchanged at the later stage of the trial.53 
The Due Process standard, then, is settled but is not without its critics, 
including Justice Blackmun, who filed a dissenting opinion in Godinez in 
which Justice Stevens joined.54 
C. The Godinez Dissent 
The dissent was concerned that applying the same competency standard to 
defendants standing trial with counsel as to defendants waiving counsel left the 
Court open to “uphold[ing] the death sentence for a person whose decision to 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 399.  “[G]reater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason” are not required 
to proceed without an attorney, because “the competence that is required of a defendant seeking 
to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent 
himself.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 49. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
 50. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. at 393 (citations omitted). 
 52. See id. at 401 n.13 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 180–81) (“As in any criminal case, a 
competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s 
competence.”); see also id. at 401 n.14 (“In this case the trial court explicitly found both that 
respondent was competent and that his waivers were knowing and voluntary.”). 
 53. See id. at 404 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Due Process Clause does not mandate 
different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the 
criminal proceedings. That was never the rule at common law, and it would take some 
extraordinary showing of the inadequacy of a single standard of competency for us to require 
States to employ heightened standards.”). 
 54. Id. at 409–17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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discharge counsel, plead guilty, and present no defense well may have been the 
product of medication or mental illness.”55  Echoing the Ninth Circuit’s 
concerns,56 the dissent cited the opinions of the two psychiatrists who 
examined Moran and found that he was “very depressed” and thus he “may be 
inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense.”57  The dissent then 
criticized the perfunctory manner in which the trial court examined Moran 
before accepting his guilty plea and waiver of counsel58 and the trial judge’s 
failure to question Moran further regarding the prescription medications he 
was taking.59 
 
 55. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 409. 
 56. The Circuit Court claimed there was “substantial evidence at the time [Moran] pled 
guilty to trigger a good faith doubt about his competency to waive constitutional rights.”  Moran 
v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1992).  The court specifically noted: 1) Moran’s suicide 
attempt, which, according to its reading of Drope, was a factor on which the Supreme Court had 
based its “conclusion that the state court should have held a hearing to determine [the 
defendant’s] competency to stand trial,”; 2) his desire to fire his attorneys and prevent the 
presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing; 3) his “monosyllabic” answers to 
the trial judge’s questions during the colloquy establishing his competence; and, 4) that Moran 
was taking four different prescription drugs.  Id. & n.3. 
 57. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 409–10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 58. The dissent was quick to point out “although the majority’s exposition of the events is 
accurate, the most significant facts are omitted or relegated to footnotes.”  Id. at 409.  The 
majority did in fact omit one particularly troubling exchange between Moran and the trial judge: 
When the trial judge asked him whether he killed his ex-wife “deliberately, with premeditation 
and malice aforethought,” Moran unexpectedly responded: “No. I didn’t do it—I mean, I wasn’t 
looking to kill her, but she ended up dead.”  Instead of probing further, the trial judge simply 
repeated the question, inquiring again whether Moran had acted deliberately. Once again, Moran 
replied: “I don’t know. I mean, I don’t know what you mean by deliberately. I mean, I pulled the 
trigger on purpose, but I didn’t plan on doing it; you know what I mean?”  Ignoring the ambiguity 
of Moran’s responses, the trial judge reframed the question to elicit an affirmative answer, 
stating: “Well, I’ve previously explained to you what is meant by deliberation and premeditation. 
Deliberate means that you arrived at or determined as a result of careful thought and weighing the 
consideration for and against the proposed action. Did you do that?” This time, Moran responded: 
“Yes.” 
Id. at 411–12 (citations omitted). 
 59. Id. at 410–11 n.1 (citations omitted).  The contrast between the majority’s and the 
dissent’s discussion of Moran’s medication is noteworthy.  Reciting the trial judge’s finding that 
Moran had waived his right to counsel and plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily, the majority 
then added in a footnote: 
During the course of this lengthy exchange, the trial court asked respondent whether he was under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, and respondent answered as follows: “Just what they give me 
in, you know, medications.”  The court made no further inquiry. The “medications” to which 
respondent referred had been prescribed to control his seizures, which were a byproduct of his 
cocaine use. 
Id. at 393 n.2 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).  On the other hand, the dissent noted with 
emphasis that Moran was on four different drugs at the time, and “later testified to the numbing 
effects of these drugs, stating: ‘I guess I really didn’t care about anything . . . . I wasn’t very 
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For the dissent, a different, perhaps higher, but certainly more 
individualized competency standard naturally attaches to waiving counsel than 
to standing trial with counsel because of the different contexts in which each 
arises: 
[T]he standard for competence to stand trial is specifically designed to measure 
a defendant’s ability to “consult with counsel” and to “assist in preparing his 
defense.” A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial establishes only 
that he is capable of aiding his attorney in making the critical decisions 
required at trial or in plea negotiations. The reliability or even relevance of 
such a finding vanishes when its basic premise—that counsel will be present—
ceases to exist. The question is no longer whether the defendant can proceed 
with an attorney, but whether he can proceed alone and uncounseled. . . . 
  The majority concludes that there is no need for such a hearing because a 
defendant who is found competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel 
is, ipso facto, competent to discharge counsel and represent himself. But the 
majority cannot isolate the term “competent” and apply it in a vacuum, 
divorced from its specific context. A person who is “competent” to play 
basketball is not thereby “competent” to play the violin. The majority’s 
monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life nor the law. 
Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for 
another purpose.60 
Logically, to the dissent, competency to waive assistance of counsel also 
implies competency to represent oneself “because the former decision 
necessarily entails the latter.”61  So what then, according to the dissent, is the 
standard for competency to self-represent? 
The dissent did not offer a clear response, but stated the Court’s 1966 
decision in Rees v. Peyton “hinted at [the] contours” of a standard when it 
“required competency evaluations to be specifically tailored to the context and 
purpose of a proceeding.”62  Rees asked what level of competence a capital 
defendant must show in order to withdraw a petition for certiorari: 
[In Rees], this Court directed the lower court to conduct an inquiry as to 
whether the defendant possessed the “capacity to appreciate his position and 
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 
 
concerned about anything that was going on . . .  as far as the proceedings and everything were 
going.’”  Id. at 410–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Then in a footnote the dissent detailed the 
medications Moran was taking and listed their possible side effects.  Id. at 411, n.1.  Here, the 
dissent mirrors the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the issue, but in fact goes further by not only 
listing the drugs and their uses, but also their side effects.  See Moran, 972 F.2d at 265 n.4. 
 60. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 412–13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 416. 
 62. Id. at 413–14 (citing Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966)).  The dissent noted that 
the Court in Rees directed the lower court “to determine [petitioner’s] mental competence in the 
present posture of things.”  Id. at 413. 
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litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, 
disorder or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the 
premises.”63 
According to the Godinez dissent, the capacity for a “rational choice” in Rees 
was essentially the same standard as the Ninth Circuit’s “capacity for a 
‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives” in Moran’s case.64  While the 
Godinez majority could see no difference between the Ninth Circuit’s 
“reasoned” or “rational choice” proposed to waive counsel and plead guilty 
and the “rational understanding” required by Dusky and Drope to stand trial,65 
Blackmun saw a marked difference, and added in a pithy footnote: “What the 
majority fails to recognize is that, in the distinction between a defendant who 
possesses a ‘rational understanding’ of the proceedings and one who is able to 
make a ‘rational choice,’ lies the difference between the capacity for passive 
and active involvement in the proceedings.”66 
Whether or not Blackmun finally intended the capacity for “rational 
choice” to be the test for competency to waive counsel and plead guilty, what 
clearly concerned him most was the effect that medication or mental illness 
might have on a defendant’s competence, and the majority’s failure to account 
for it.  Blackmun had “no doubt” that the trial judge should have questioned 
Moran’s competency to dismiss his lawyers given the evidence: 
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes 
fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our criminal 
justice system. I cannot condone the decision to accept, without further 
inquiry, the self-destructive “choice” of a person who was so deeply medicated 
and who might well have been severely mentally ill.67 
In fact, the Godinez the standard has drawn scholarly criticism for concerns 
similar to those outlined by Blackmun’s dissent. 
D. Scholarship and the Current Standard 
One theme running through much scholarly criticism of the Godinez 
competency standard and its forebears, Dusky and Drope, is that a “one size 
fits all” standard, by its nature, fails to account for differences between 
individual inmates, leading to unjust results in some cases.68  This echoes 
 
 63. Id. at 415 (quoting Rees, 384 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added)). 
 64. Id.; Moran, 972 F.2d at 266 (citations omitted). 
 65. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398. 
 66. Id. at 415 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 417. 
 68. See, e.g., Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The 
Colin Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard,  5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (Fall 
1995).  Kuby and Kunstler represented Colin Ferguson at trial before Ferguson dismissed them.  
See id. at 19.  Ferguson was diagnosed with delusional disorder by the defense psychiatrist, and 
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Justice Blackmun’s concern in his Godinez dissent that competence as to one 
thing, such as understanding the nature of the proceedings and assisting 
counsel in your defense, does not necessarily entail competence as to 
something else, such as dismissing counsel altogether and pleading guilty.69  
The context of waiving counsel and proceeding pro se demands something 
different, perhaps more, from a defendant than the context of standing trial 
with a lawyer demands.  Behind this particular critique of Godinez is a belief 
that it is unjust to grant Faretta’s claim “that although the defendant ‘may 
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must 
honored.’”70  Our system of criminal justice owes something more to the 
individual defendant than the Godinez Court’s resignation to the fact that 
“while ‘[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could 
better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,’ a 
criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his 
competence to choose self-representation.”71 
One author, a psychiatrist, notes that Godinez thereby extends Faretta’s 
right to self-representation to include the right to represent oneself 
incompetently.72  The Godinez dissent was “much more tightly reasoned . . . 
and in agreement with the real exigencies of proceeding to trial pro se than [] 
the majority opinion.”73  The Godinez standard measures only the defendant’s 
“decisional capacity,” that is, the mental functions required to decide whether 
to waive counsel.74  According to the author, the Court “entirely neglected the 
voice of reason” by not also incorporating a “functional capacity” element into 
the competency standard.75  “[T]he defendant who represents himself or herself 
must have greater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason than would 
 
even the prosecution psychiatrist stated that Ferguson was “very, very paranoid.”  Id.  Ferguson, 
according to his lawyers, had an “irrational belief that there existed multiple conspiracies against 
him,” including one involving his attorneys, yet the trial court found he was competent to stand 
trial because he “could understand the nature of the charges against him and could assist in his 
own defense” and was thus competent to represent himself.  Id. at 19–20.  Ferguson’s self-
representation resulted in a “bizarre trial” which was an “obscene spectacle,” a “mocker[y] of 
justice,” and “a good example of just how insane one can be and yet be found competent to stand 
trial.” Id. at 19, 24. 
 69. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 70. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Alan R. Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive 
Counsel and Conduct One’s Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 105 (Feb. 1994). 
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. See id. at 105.  Felthous also notes that the practice of applying the same standard both to 
the competency to stand trial and competency to waive counsel was common to many courts 
before Godinez.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 109. 
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be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.”76  The author closes by 
noting that “the Supreme Court in Godinez missed an opportunity to promote 
reason, logic, and justice in American jurisprudence,” but that the decision did 
not forestall state legislatures from demanding more.77 
Another scholar, John H. Blume, argues not that Godinez settled on the 
wrong standard,78 but that competence alone is not enough when it comes to 
deciding whether to prevent or allow volunteers to waive appeals and 
acquiesce in their death sentence.79  Blume recasts the debate over competency 
and volunteering in terms of suicide and motivation, incorporating society’s 
general disapproval of suicide and the current legal barriers to physician-
assisted suicide.80  With empirical and anecdotal data in hand, he asks with 
incisively simple logic: if we disapprove of suicide then should we allow death 
row inmates who wish to commit suicide to do so with the help of the criminal 
justice system?81 
Death row volunteers, it turns out, share many striking similarities with 
those who commit suicide in the outside world.  Overwhelmingly, they are 
white males who suffer from mental illness and substance abuse disorders.82  
Over a two-year period, 73% of all suicides in the United States were 
committed by white men.83  Blume continues: 
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”), over 90% of 
suicide victims suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder, most commonly a 
depressive disorder or a substance-abuse disorder.  There is also a high 
prevalence of bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other 
personality disorders. Substance abuse is found in 25% to 55% of suicides, 
though two-thirds of suicide victims who were substance abusers also suffered 
from a major depressive episode.84 
Moreover, depression, alcohol abuse, and cocaine use are among the strongest 
risk factors for attempted suicide among adults.85  Blume went on to analyze 
comparable demographic data for death row volunteers: 
 
 76. Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
 77. Felthous, supra note 72, at 110.  In Indiana v. Edwards the Court reaffirmed this portion 
of Godinez, holding that a state may constitutionally deny a defendant who is competent to stand 
trial the right to represent himself if it found him incompetent to conduct trial proceedings.  128 
S.Ct. 2379, 2388 (2008). 
 78. See Blume, supra note 7, at 945–46.  Neither does he claim that Godinez is the right 
standard, but for his purposes it simply is the standard.  Id. 
 79. Id. at 973. 
 80. Id. at 942. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 961–64. 
 83. Blume, supra note 7, at 956 (citations omitted). 
 84. Id. at 956–57 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 958. 
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Almost 85% of those who were executed after waiving their appeals are white 
males, despite the fact that white males account for only about 45% of all 
death-row inmates.  Looked at from the perspective of the other major racial 
group on death row, African Americans, the pattern is equally stark: only 3% 
of volunteer executions involved black men, who comprise 42% of the current 
death-row population.86 
Digging into the etiological data on volunteers, Blume uncovered further 
striking parallels with suicide outside the prison context.  Among volunteers, 
88% suffered from mental illness, severe substance abuse disorders, or both.87  
But by Blume’s assessment, 
[e]ven more striking is the prevalence of the most severe mental illness (which 
also happens to be the strongest suicide predictor): fourteen [of the 106] cases 
involved schizophrenia, and several more reported delusions that may reflect 
schizophrenia.  Depression, and its half-sibling, bipolar disorder, accounted for 
at least twenty-three other cases, and post-traumatic stress disorder was present 
in another ten. Finally, at least thirty had previously attempted suicide.88 
Thus, the conclusion is all but unavoidable that many volunteers are 
motivated to terminate appeals by a desire to commit suicide.  “[G]iven the 
current legal norms prohibiting assisted suicide, we should ask whether, at 
least in some instances, the act of volunteering is best characterized as 
suicidal,” an inquiry to which the current competency standard is indifferent.89 
Blume argues that in addition to a competency evaluation under the 
Godinez standard courts should ask whether a volunteer is motivated by the 
desire to commit suicide or the “desire to accept the justness of [his] 
punishment.”90  A competent inmate who volunteers out of a desire to accept 
his punishment should be allowed to waive appeals, but the state should not 
accommodate the desires of a suicidal volunteer.91  The court should make this 
determination by applying a two-part test. 
First, the court must find that the punishment is objectively just, because 
“in order for acceptance of just punishment to legitimate what appears to be 
(and has the same consequences as) suicide, the punishment must actually be 
just.”92  Under this prong of the test, Blume identifies three reasons that could 
preclude a death sentence: (1) factual innocence, that is, innocence of the 
underlying crime; (2) “‘innocence of the death penalty,’ which generally refers 
to the absence of an aggravating factor that renders a crime death eligible,” 
 
 86. Id. at 961–62 (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 962. 
 88. Blume, supra note 7, at 963. 
 89. Id. at 942, 973. 
 90. Id. at 968. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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and; (3) categorical ineligibility, such as falling below the minimum age 
requirement or as a result of mental retardation.93  At later stages few cases 
have non-frivolous claims of innocence, innocence of the death penalty, or 
categorical ineligibility, but in cases where such claims still exist, a court 
should rule on the merits of those claims before allowing the inmate to waive 
appeals.94  The burden of persuasion would, of course, remain the same as pre-
conviction.95 
Second, if the court is satisfied that the death penalty is just in the 
particular case, it should then 
conduct a second, subjective inquiry: Why does the volunteer want to waive 
his appeals? If the answer is that, with due regard for individual variation in 
phrasing, he accepts that death is the appropriate punishment for his crime, 
then he should be permitted to waive his appeals. If, on the other hand, the 
motivation appears suicidal, then waiver should not be permitted.96 
Blume would place the burden on the proponent of the waiver, thus the death 
row inmate would bear the burden of showing that he is not motivated by the 
desire for suicide.97  Finally, Blume proposes that the proof standard should be 
clear and convincing evidence.98  Due to the high stakes of waiving appeals 
and the “high likelihood of suicidal motivation,” a higher standard than mere 
preponderance is appropriate.99  At the same time, “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” might carry too heavy a burden for those inmates legitimately 
motivated by a desire to accept their punishment.100 
Blume concludes by noting that death row inmates are not “fungible,” and 
therefore individualization is paramount to adequately answering the questions 
that volunteerism raises.101  A workable response is unlikely from “sweeping 
generalizations,” and it’s only “by examining the motivation of each individual 
volunteer” that we will arrive at the right answers.102  Chapman’s case provides 
a fertile ground on which to test Blume’s proposal.  The next part recounts the 
factual and procedural history of the case, and explores the Kentucky high 
court’s ruling on mandatory appeal. 
 
 93. Blume, supra note 7, at 969 & n.147 (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 971. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 969. 
 97. Id. at 971–72. 
 98. Blume, supra note 7, at 972. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 983. 
 102. Id. at 984. 
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II.  THE CHAPMAN CASE 
A. Facts of the Crime103 
Early in the morning of August 23, 2002, Marco Allen Chapman knocked 
on the door of Carolyn and Chuck Marksberry’s house in Warsaw, Kentucky, a 
small town about 45 miles from Cincinnati for which Carolyn served as city 
clerk.104  Mr. Marksberry was overseas in Spain for job training.105  Mrs. 
Marksberry was home, along with her three children, Courtney (age ten), 
Chelbi (age seven), and Cody (age six).106  She answered the door and 
recognized Chapman, with whom she was acquainted.107  Chapman had lived 
with her best friend, and Mrs. Marksberry, in fact, had recently encouraged her 
to get out of her “abusive” relationship with Chapman.108 Chapman asked to 
use the phone, and Mrs. Marksberry let him in.109 
Chapman then pulled a knife from a duffel bag he was carrying, put the 
knife to Mrs. Marksberry’s throat and asked for all her money and credit 
cards.110  He led her to the bedroom where he bound her with duct tape and a 
vacuum cleaner cord.111  Chapman forcibly raped Mrs. Marksberry, stabbed 
her repeatedly, pausing more than once to go into the kitchen to replenish 
knives he had broken in the process.112  He left her for dead, and then attacked 
the three children who were awakened by their mother’s screaming.113 
Chapman attacked Courtney, the oldest child, first, stabbing her numerous 
times and cutting her throat.114  Courtney went motionless, playing dead, 
forced to remain still to protect herself while watching Chapman attack her 
younger brother and sister.115  He stabbed both young children repeatedly, and 
 
 103. A more detailed factual narrative than is strictly necessary to analyze the legal issues is 
included.  As Blume noted, individualization is vital when analyzing volunteerism, and 
individualization requires one to keep one eye on the particular crime—the defendant, the 
victims—and the other eye on the broader issues implicated. 
 104. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 1; Mark Pitsch, Two Gallatin Children Killed in 
Knife Attack; Mom, Sister Hurt; Suspect Arrested in West Virginia, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 105. Pitsch, supra note 105. 
 106. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. Jim Hannah, Randy McNutt & Cindy Schroeder, Mother, Children Stabbed, Two 
Fatally: Woman Urged Friend to Break Up with Suspect, CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 109. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2. 
 112. Id. at 2–3. 
 113. Joseph Gerth, Police Say Murder Suspect in Knife Attack Confessed, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville, Ky), Sept. 11, 2002, at A1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 2. 
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fatally slashed each of their throats.116  Courtney fled through the back door 
and sought help at a neighbor’s house.117  Mrs. Marksberry, meanwhile, 
managed to free herself by chewing through the duct tape and kicking free 
from the electrical cord.118  She crawled through the house, past her son’s dead 
body, and across the street, and woke up a neighbor by banging her head on the 
door.119  The police arrived to find Cody and Chelbi dead; they rushed Mrs. 
Marksberry and Courtney to the hospital.120 
Chapman fled the scene and stopped briefly at a family friend’s house to 
clean himself up and borrow his friend’s truck, leaving a note saying he was 
using it to pick up a load of firewood.121  Police mounted a swift interstate 
manhunt based on information from one of Chapman’s former co-workers that 
he was headed to Cabin Creek, West Virginia.122  Within hours, Chapman was 
arrested in West Virginia, where police spotted him driving the truck he 
reportedly borrowed from his friend.123  Police found blood on Chapman’s 
clothing, a bloody knife in the truck he was driving, and blood in the car he left 
at his friend’s house.124 
B. Procedural Facts 
Marco Allen Chapman was arrested in West Virginia, less than 300 miles 
from the gruesome scene he left at the Marksberry’s house, and just over six 
hours after the attacks.125  He was arraigned in Charleston, West Virginia, and 
waived extradition proceedings on August 27, 2002.126  Two days later, 
Chapman was received and arrested by Kentucky State Police, and placed in 
the Boone County Jail.127  On August 30, a district judge set Chapman’s bond 
at $50 million and appointed John Delaney and Jim Gibson, of the Department 
of Public Advocacy, to defend Chapman.128 
After a preliminary hearing was held, a grand jury handed down a nine-
count indictment against Chapman.129  Chapman was charged with two counts 
 
 116. Gerth, supra note 113. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hannah, McNutt & Schroeder, supra note 108. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 4. 
 123. Id. at 4–5. 
 124. Gerth, supra note 113. 
 125. Id.; Pitsch, supra note 105. 
 126. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 5; Hannah, McNutt & Schroeder, supra note 108. 
 127. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. 
 128. Jim Hannah, Accused Held on $50M Bond in Kids’ Deaths, CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 31, 
2002, at B1; see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 6. 
 129. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. 
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of murder, two counts of criminal attempt to commit murder, first-degree rape, 
first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and one count of being a second-
degree felony offender (Chapman had been convicted of federal bank robbery 
in Texas).130  The prosecutor immediately filed notice that the Commonwealth 
would seek the death penalty, based on aggravating circumstances including 
murder committed concurrently with other felonies and committing multiple 
murders.131  Chapman was arraigned on October 7, 2002, and, through his 
attorneys, pleaded not guilty.132  At pretrial hearings, a judge agreed to remove 
the case to neighboring Boone County133 and decided that police had properly 
informed Chapman of his Miranda rights before an hour and a half long taped 
confession.134 
During a January 15, 2004 transfer for a pretrial hearing, Chapman 
managed to unshackle his legs and attempted to escape, running across a 
parking lot.135  Court officers tackled Chapman within 10 yards, his hands still 
cuffed and chained at the waist.136  Chapman explained later that it was a 
suicide mission, intended to provoke the police into shooting him on the 
spot.137 
Months later, in October of 2004, Marco Allen Chapman’s intent to 
receive the death penalty came to the forefront of the case.  Chapman wrote a 
letter to Circuit Judge Tony Frohlich, asking to fire his attorneys, plead guilty 
to the murders, and requesting a death sentence.138  In the letter, Chapman 
claimed that he wanted “the Marksberrys to feel that justice has been served 
with my death, instead of a possibility of me living, when their children are 
dead from my hands.”139  Moreover, wrote Chapman, “I only wish the judge to 
sentence me to death so no one can feel responsible for another’s death, 
including mine,” because “I want no one to feel morally and/or spiritually 
wrong, because death is a just sentence that I am seeking for my sins.”140 
Judge Frohlich refused to grant Chapman’s request immediately, instead 
opting to send Chapman to the state’s correctional psychiatric center for 30 
 
 130. Jim Hannah, Death Penalty Sought in Stabbing, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 26, 2002, at 1C. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Tom O’Neill, Courthouse Packed for Arraignment: Chapman Enters Not Guilty Pleas, 
CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 8, 2002, at 1B. 
 133. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Jim Hannah, Accused Killer Fails in Run for Freedom, CIN. ENQUIRER, Jan. 15, 2004, at 
C1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 3. 
 138. Karen Gutierrez & Mike Rutledge, Slain Kids’ Family Hopes Accused Gets Death Wish, 
CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 23, 2004, at B10. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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days of evaluation and therapy to ensure his competence.141  The decision 
infuriated the victims’ family, but seemed reasonable to the prosecution and 
was received favorably by the defense lawyers.142  According to Delaney, one 
of the public defenders, Chapman was “not competent to make those 
decisions,” and the judge “was wise to wrestle with the issue now,” because it 
would almost certainly have come back on appeal.143 
On December 7, 2004, Judge Frohlich granted Chapman’s requests.144  The 
judge, convinced of Chapman’s competency based on the testimony of a 
psychiatrist, allowed Chapman to fire his attorneys and plead guilty to all eight 
charges.145  According to a news report, “[o]ne document alone required his 
signature for each of 13 constitutional rights he waived in his quest to be put to 
death . . . .”146  Judge Frohlich then asked the public defenders Delaney and 
Gibson to remain on “standby” in case Chapman needed counsel.147  Delaney 
said he wanted to play no part in Chapman’s “suicide,” and both men agreed 
they would only serve if ordered by the court; Judge Frohlich ordered them to 
act as standby counsel.148 
On December 14, 2004, Marco Allen Chapman was sentenced to die for 
the murders of Chelbi and Cody Sharon.149  Chapman represented himself at 
the hearing.150  However, at least one more hurdle stood between Chapman and 
execution, namely, an appeal to the Supreme Court mandated by state law.151 
C. The Kentucky Supreme Court Reviews Chapman’s Case 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed 
Chapman’s conviction and death sentences.152  Chapman’s new public 
defenders, who replaced the standby counsel, advanced a number of 
arguments, alleging constitutional violations and procedural problems, most of 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Karen Gutierrez & Mike Rutledge, Suspect in Kids’ Killing Asks to Die, CIN. ENQUIRER, 
Oct. 23, 2004, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/10/23/loc_kypenalty23.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Mike Rutledge, Murderer Pleads, Wants Death, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 11. 
 150. Jim Hannah, Judge Gives Killer His Wish: Death, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 15, 2004, at A1. 
 151. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075 (2007). (“Whenever the death penalty is imposed for a 
capital offense, and upon the judgment becoming final in the Circuit Court, the sentence shall be 
reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court.”) 
 152. Chapman v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-000070-MR, 2007 WL 2404429 (Ky. Aug. 
23, 2007). 
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which the Court disposed of easily on firmly established precedent.153  
However, the substance of the decision154 centered on the issue of Chapman’s 
competence, which the Court analyzed as two separate questions: What is the 
standard of competence to plead guilty?  Is there a different standard of 
competence to plead guilty to a capital offense? 
The Court first addressed the question of whether a higher standard of 
competence is required for defendants to plead guilty than to stand trial.155  
Kentucky’s statutory definition of incompetence to stand trial closely parallels 
Dusky, which the Court also cited favorably:156 “‘Incompetency to stand trial’ 
means, as a result of mental condition, lack of capacity to appreciate the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against one or to participate rationally in 
one’s own defense[.]”157  Adopting Godinez, the Court declined to create a 
higher standard to plead guilty, and found “the following logic expressed by 
the [Godinez] Court to be especially convincing:” 
[A]ll criminal defendants—not merely those who plead guilty—may be 
required to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been 
initiated. And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, 
it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may 
be called upon to make during the course of a trial. . . . This being so, we can 
conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those 
defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for 
 
 153. Id.  The arguments included, inter alia, that the death penalty is unconstitutional, that the 
court’s method of conducting proportionality review was unconstitutional, and that lethal 
injection and electrocution violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Id. at *3.  In denying the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court observed: “We have 
consistently held that neither lethal injection nor electrocution is an unconstitutional violation of 
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, and Chapman has 
not presented anything causing us to doubt that conclusion.”  Id. 
 154. Competency was not the only defense theory that implicated the unique concerns raised 
by volunteerism.  In fact, several of the other arguments are germane to a discussion of 
volunteerism more generally, but outside the scope of this article.  For example, the defense 
argued that “[t]he trial court erred by requiring the same attorneys Chapman had already fired to 
serve as standby counsel since those attorneys disagreed with his stated goal of seeking the death 
penalty[.]”  Id. at *3.  The Court expressed disappointment with the prosecution’s failure to 
respond to this particular argument on the part of the defense, but resolved the question in the 
Commonwealth’s favor anyway.  Id. at *5–6.   The Court reasoned that despite Chapman’s 
objection to any counsel at all, and standby counsel in particular, the Commonwealth’s and the 
defendant’s interests were well served by the attorneys staying on standby based on their 
familiarity with the case.  Id.  In addition, the defense argued the state was constitutionally bound 
to hear all mitigation evidence; the Court rejected the argument.  Id. at *6–9. 
 155. Id. at *10–11 
 156. Id. at *10 n.49. 
 157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.060(4) (2007). 
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defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead 
guilty.158 
So despite recognizing the extensive evidence of Chapman’s troubled 
background offered by the defense,159 the Court found that Chapman was 
competent to plead guilty.  The Court did not end its inquiry there, however, 
but asked further whether the standard to plead guilty is higher in the context 
of a capital crime. 
The heart of the defense’s approach was to urge the Kentucky high court to 
recognize that the gravity of the stakes involved in pleading guilty to a capital 
offense demand a deeper inquiry into a defendant’s competence.160  The 
defense asked the court to adopt the purportedly higher standard of competence 
from Rees v. Peyton,161 as articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. 
Ashworth in the context of a volunteer’s waiver of the presentation of 
mitigating evidence.162  The standard, according to the Ohio Court a “more 
specific statement of the general language used in Rees,”163 is as follows: 
A defendant is mentally competent to forgo the presentation of mitigating 
evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case if he has the mental capacity to 
understand the choice between life and death and to make a knowing and 
intelligent decision not to pursue the presentation of evidence. The defendant 
must fully comprehend the ramifications of his decision, and must possess the 
 
 158. Chapman, 2007 WL 2404429, at *11 (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 387, 398–99 
(1993)). 
 159. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 1–10.  The defense showed evidence of 
Chapman’s history of physical and sexual abuse, drug and alcohol addiction, depression and other 
mental illnesses, and several suicide attempts.  See id.  They attempted to argue that depression 
and suicidal preoccupation may have caused Chapman to plead guilty, even claiming the 
psychiatrist who examined Chapman and testified at each of his competency hearings “thought 
Chapman might decide not to plead to die if he were treated” for his depression.  Id. at 9.  
Without any legal authority on which to hang, however, these arguments amounted to little more 
than an opportunity to reiterate the truly tragic history of their client. 
 160. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 10–26. 
 161. 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (directing the lower court to determine the defendant’s 
“competence in the present posture of things, that is, whether he has capacity to appreciate his 
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or 
on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may 
substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”).  Note that Rees’ status in federal law is unclear 
at this point.  Rees involved a capital defendant withdrawing his petition for certiorari, a context 
very similar to the various modes of volunteering.  See id. at 313–14.  The Godinez majority paid 
it little attention, citing it only in a footnote leading one to believe that its application is only 
appropriate in the context of withdrawing certiorari, not, in the context of death row volunteering 
and competency generally.  Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 n.9. 
 162. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 11–12, 16 (citing State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 
1231, 1240 (Ohio 1999) (citing State v. Berry, 659 N.E.2d 796 (Ohio 1997))). 
 163. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d at 1241. 
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ability to reason logically, i.e., to choose means that relate logically to his 
ends.164 
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished Rees,165 it went on to 
adopt Ohio’s Ashworth test, the very test propounded by the defense, 
verbatim.166  The defense won the point, it seems, but lost the game, set, and 
match. 
Applying the defense’s own competency test, the Court affirmed the trial 
judge’s finding that Chapman was competent to plead guilty to capital 
crimes.167  A psychiatrist evaluated Chapman on three separate occasions, and 
each time found him competent while acknowledging his troubled history of 
abuse, addiction, and mental illness.168  “Moreover, the trial court refused to 
accept passively Chapman’s guilty plea, instead referring him for treatment at 
[the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center] before accepting his guilty 
plea.”169  Although the defense criticized the judge for only ordering a thirty-
day evaluation of Chapman, “from [the Court’s] vantage point, the trial court 
should be commended, not condemned, for taking extraordinary precautions to 
ensure that Chapman was pleading guilty knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, 
and competently.”170 
If the defense won the issue and persuaded the Court to apply a supposedly 
heightened standard for competency in the context of volunteering for death 
row, then why did it still lose the appeal?  Is the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
new standard an improvement on Dusky & Drope, and, by extension, Godinez?  
The next part will analyze the result in the Chapman case, and explore whether 
the scholars, and in particular John Blume, offer a better, workable approach. 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. The Court argued what really concerned the Rees Court was that the defendant 
abandoned his defense suddenly.  Chapman, 2007 WL 2404429 at *14.  The case was not an 
ideal fit because Chapman essentially abandoned his defense from day one.  Id.  It is debatable 
whether it is more striking for a defendant who has been on death row for a decade or more and 
exhausted the appeals process to “suddenly” abandon his writ of certiorari (a long shot, to be 
sure), than for a defendant never to mount any kind of defense, but rather plead guilty and seek 
the death penalty for himself.  Some commentators have argued that the demoralizing life on 
death row leads many inmates to give up hope and waive appeals, that is, volunteer, in order to 
escape the hopelessness.  See, e.g., Urofsky, supra note 15, at 568–73 (describing, through first-
hand accounts, the demoralizing conditions of life on death row, and concluding “[i]f one is going 
to argue that even condemned murderers retain some spark of humanity, some rights of individual 
autonomy, then something must be done to either improve death row conditions, or permit those 
who wish to terminate that existence through execution of sentence the right to do so”). 
 166. Chapman, 2007 WL 2404429 at *15 (quoting Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d at 1241). 
 167. Id. at *16. 
 168. Id. at *15. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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III.  ANALYZING CHAPMAN 
A. Was Chapman Competent Under the Legal Standard? 
Examining the Chapman result from a legal perspective, it is difficult to 
argue that the Kentucky Supreme Court got it wrong.  The Godinez majority 
stated plainly, that “[w]hile psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to 
classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free 
to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky 
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional 
requirements.”171  The Kentucky Court took them up on the offer and adopted 
a standard that articulates a more specific standard for the context of a death 
penalty volunteer.  Dusky & Drope require a defendant exhibit (1) a sufficient 
present ability to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his defense 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and (2) a rational and 
factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him.172  The new Chapman standard requires a defendant to have the mental 
capacity (1) to understand the choice between life and death, (2) to make a 
knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue his defense, (3) to fully 
comprehend the ramifications of his decision, and (4) to reason logically, that 
is, to choose means that logically relate to his desired ends.173 
The Kentucky Court applied this test to Chapman and yet found him 
competent.174  It is not a surprising result for this case, however, and not only 
because the clear error standard of review imposes a high bar for overturning 
the trial judge’s ruling.175  As the Court noted, the trial judge was exceptionally 
thorough, and approached the determination of Chapman’s competence with 
abundant caution.176  Chapman’s mental health was examined on three separate 
occasions, each including extensive interviews and testing, and each followed 
by a hearing at which the evaluating psychiatrist testified and the judge found 
Chapman competent.177  The third evaluation followed a thirty-day observation 
at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center and included a 
neuropsychological examination, and it was only after this additional 
precaution and a forty-minute colloquy that the judge accepted Chapman’s 
guilty pleas and death sentence.178 
 
 171. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993). 
 172. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 
(1975). 
 173. See Chapman, 2007 WL 2404429 at *15. 
 174. Id. at *16. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 167–71. 
 177. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 6–10. 
 178. Id. 
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The defense characterized these hearings as tainted by “leading questions” 
met with simple “yes and no” answers, and claimed that “Chapman appeared 
to simply be saying what he knew he needed to say to accomplish his 
suicide . . . .”179  The judge’s colloquy with Chapman was “superficial” rather 
than the “penetrating and comprehensive examination” required.180 
The prosecution, predictably, took a different view of the trial judge’s 
procedures.  “Ordering three evaluations and conducting three competency 
hearings was the product of conscientiousness and thoroughness on the part of 
the learned trial judge.”181  Far from being superficial, the “colloquy conducted 
here could fairly be described as a clinic on how to make absolutely certain 
that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”182  In fact, the trial 
judge expressed a belief that the standard for competency to stand trial was not 
the same as the standard to dismiss counsel, plead guilty, or request the death 
sentence, and instead applied a more exacting standard.183 
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that Chapman was 
not in fact competent under either the previous standard or the Chapman 
Court’s new standard, and the defense’s conclusory allegations about the 
inadequacy of the hearing does little to change that conclusion.  Under 
Kentucky’s normal standard, Chapman did not appear “as a result of mental 
condition, [to] lack . . . capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against [him] or to participate rationally” in his own 
defense.184  Even under the new, arguably more specific standard, Chapman 
appeared to comprehend the magnitude of his decision.  In his letter to the trial 
judge, Chapman wrote: 
I don’t understand why these crimes occurred and I only want to finally end all 
the pain and suffering in all of thoes around me.  I am so sorry and remorseful 
for the crimes I have commited that the pain and guilt have become to much 
for me to bare.  I have had a troubled life but it doesn’t give me the right or 
excuse to inflict pain on others.  Especially children. 
I feel with me being executed is the only way that the Marksburys will have 
peace of mind as well s me.  That may sound selfish on my part but truely I 
only want this to be over with so they can finally have closure and begin to 
heal.185 
In light of the three separate psychiatric evaluations and extensive questioning 
by the trial judge, the sentiment of this letter underscores that Chapman likely 
 
 179. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 21, 25. 
 180. Id. at 23, 25 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948)). 
 181. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 12. 
 182. Id. at 14–15. 
 183. Id. at 9. 
 184. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.060(4) (2007). 
 185. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 41 (reproduced without corrections). 
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knew very well the choice between life and death, understood his decision not 
to pursue his defense, fully comprehended the ramifications of his decision, 
and chose logical means—execution—to obtain his desired end—to put to rest 
the suffering of his victims’ family and himself. 
Thus, under the legal standard, Chapman was likely competent.  But that 
does not address the propriety or deficiency of the legal standard itself.  For the 
opponent of volunteering, the result is still unsatisfactory, begging the 
question, does the Kentucky standard cure the perceived ills of the Godinez 
standard? 
B. Did Kentucky Choose the Right Standard? 
Both the Godinez dissent186 and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the same 
case187 raised specific concerns about the effect mental illness or medication 
may have on a defendant’s decision to waive counsel and plead guilty.  The 
tests propounded by each sought to account for this distinction by adding the 
requirement that the defendant have the capacity for reasoned or rational 
choice, not simply understanding.188  Both opinions focused attention on the 
defendant’s depression in particular, and the possibility that the defendant gave 
up on his defense as a result of being depressed.189  Chapman’s lawyers echoed 
this concern arguing, if somewhat vaguely, that Chapman’s dismissal of 
counsel and guilty pleas may have been the result of his depression.190  
However, it is not clear how, in either Moran’s or Chapman’s case, the 
proposed “heightened” standard would have better answered this problem. 
The Godinez dissent, for example, does not make it clear how requiring an 
increased capacity to represent oneself would have affected the defendant’s 
competency.  The opinion quoted one of the testifying psychiatrist’s opinions 
that the defendant was “in full control of his faculties insofar as his ability to 
aid counsel, assist in his own defense, recall evidence and to give testimony if 
called upon to do so.”191  What the dissent found worrisome, in addition to the 
prescription drugs the defendant was taking, was that the psychiatrist also 
observed, “[p]sychologically, and perhaps legally speaking, this man, because 
 
 186. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 409 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“the majority 
upholds the death sentence for a person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead guilty, and 
present no defense well may have been the product of medication or mental illness.”). 
 187. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 268 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the evaluating 
psychiatrist commented that defendant’s depression may cause him to expend less effort in his 
defense, and that the doctor’s report “is all the weaker as an indication of [defendant’s] 
competency to waive his constitutional rights because it says nothing about the effects of any 
medication”). 
 188. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 415. 
 189. Id. at 409–10; Moran, 972 F.2d at 268. 
 190. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 6, 9. 
 191. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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he is expressing and feeling considerable remorse and guilt, may be inclined to 
exert less effort towards his own defense.”192  The opinion does not make 
specific claims of diminished capacity, or explain how this particular death 
row convict’s understandable remorse and guilt would leave him unable to 
participate actively in his own defense.  Chapman’s lawyers made a similar 
conclusory argument—his history of abuse, suicidal thoughts and mental 
illness “may have caused him to make [the] decision” to dismiss counsel, and 
plead guilty.193  Notably absent is any specific argument, under the legal 
standard the Kentucky Court chose to adopt, that these facts rendered him 
incompetent. 
In fact, what seems to underlie the losing arguments in both cases is a 
concern not about capacity, but about motivation.  That is, the defendant’s 
hopeless outlook rather than his diminished capacity to reason, caused him to 
make poor legal decisions.  A plausible reading is that the losing side, in each 
case, the side that would have found the defendant incompetent, was grasping 
not for a standard that more precisely assessed a defendant’s functional ability 
to make life and death decisions for himself without the aid of counsel, but for 
a standard that would prevent a defendant from volunteering.194 
In other words, a standard of competency that focuses on capacity, no 
matter how elaborate and nuanced, will not necessarily alleviate the concerns 
of those of us whose visceral reaction to Chapman’s case is that something in 
our justice system is broken—that even a patently guilty defendant should not 
be given the key to the execution chamber and told, “We’ll leave the light on 
for you.”®  What, then, could be a practicable safeguard to bar convicts from 
committing “suicide by court”?  John Blume offers a solution that requires 
courts to apply a “competence plus” test, where competence alone seems 
inadequate. 
C. Is Competence Enough? 
Blume’s proposal is not a clarification of, or elaboration on, a competency 
standard, but instead creates an additional requirement courts could impose 
before allowing a defendant to volunteer.195  Applying Blume’s two-pronged 
test to Chapman’s case is an instructive exercise which sheds clarifying light 
on why many legal scholars may have an instinctual repulsion to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chapman. 
First, the objective prong: is the punishment actually just, or was Chapman 
perhaps factually innocent, innocent of the death penalty, or categorically 
 
 192. Id. at 409–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 193. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 6. 
 194. This certainly reinforces the conventional wisdom that capital punishment abolitionists 
oppose volunteerism.  See supra note 16. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 89–99. 
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ineligible?196  Chapman, of course, was not found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt by a jury of his peers, but rather pleaded guilty to each of the charges 
against him. The evidence against him, however, was effectively 
incontrovertible, so assuming his factual guilt is not a stretch.  This 
assumption, by extension, establishes the aggravating factors which made his 
crimes death eligible, so he was not innocent of the death penalty.  Finally, 
there is no indication of mental illness or any other factor that would have left 
him categorically ineligible for execution.  So the punishment was objectively 
just—with the conspicuous caveat that none of these issues was actually 
litigated (discussed below)—so next is the subjective inquiry. 
Was Chapman motivated by a desire to accept the justness of his 
punishment or by a desire to commit suicide?  Recalling that Blume proposed 
applying the clear and convincing standard of proof and saddling the defendant 
with the burden,197 is it clear what motivated Chapman’s guilty pleas?  I would 
argue that it is not at all clear in Chapman’s case what his primary motivation 
was, and it is unclear in Blume’s proposal how such a case of “mixed motives” 
should be handled. 
Chapman had attempted suicide in the past.198  In fact, the day he was 
arrested he pleaded with the police to shoot him because all that could help 
him now was “the electric chair.”199  He later engineered a ham-handed escape 
attempt, running from his guards, still shackled, in a self-styled suicide mission 
shouting, “Shoot me, Shoot me!”200  Moreover, he referred explicitly to his 
desire to commit “suicide by court.”201 
On the other hand, there was substantial evidence that he was motivated by 
remorse and acceptance of the punishment he felt he deserved.  In his letter to 
the trial judge, Chapman admitted: “I have had a troubled life but in [sic] 
doesn’t give me the right or excuse to inflict pain on others. Especially 
children.”202  “I only wish the judge to sentence me to death so no one can feel 
responsible for another’s death, including mine,” because “I want no one to 
feel morally and/or spiritually wrong, because death is a just sentence that I am 
seeking for my sins.”203  At his sentencing hearing, Chapman reiterated his 
remorse: “It probably means nothing, but I do want to apologize to Caroline 
Marksberry, to her family, her children and to everybody I’ve hurt.  I don’t 
know exactly what happened that night, though whatever I did, all I know is I 
 
 196. Blume, supra note 7, at 968–69. 
 197. Id. at 971–72. 
 198. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 199. Id. at 3. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 41. 
 203. Gutierrez & Rutledge, supra note 138. 
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can’t undo what I’ve done.”204  “[I]t is not honorable for me to do what I am 
doing,” Chapman said of his decision to plead guilty and seek the death 
penalty, he was doing it for Marksberry and her family.205 
It is hard to say how a court applying Blume’s test, which essentially calls 
for a binary determination of motivation, would resolve Chapman’s case.  The 
evidence cuts both ways, of course.  But beyond that, the suicide motivation 
and the “acceptance of just punishment” motivation seem to exist not in 
varying measures side by side, but in interdependence.  That is to say, 
Chapman’s desire for “suicide by court” can plausibly be interpreted as a 
desire to have his just sentence carried out more swiftly for the benefit of all 
parties—the state, the victims, and himself.  He desired his own death, to be 
sure, but that desire was, at least in some measure, fueled by genuine contrition 
and a clear understanding of the price that he should pay.  Ultimately, applying 
Blume’s test requires an oversimplification of something which is irreducibly 
complex, human motivation, and thus, fails to address the possibility that 
“conflicting” motivations may be fundamentally intertwined.206  Although he 
claims, perhaps rightly, that the current legal standard of competency is not 
“sufficiently nuanced to protect against death-row inmates using the legal 
system as a means of suicide,”207 his proposal fails Chapman for lack of 
nuance, which hints at the conclusion that adjudicating motivation in this 
context is impracticable. 
D. If Not Competence, Then What? 
Adjudging competence with heightened specificity, or measuring 
competence and motivation both potentially fail to prevent death row inmates 
like Marc Allen Chapman from fast-tracking their executions.  Yet the 
opponent of volunteerism is still left with a sense that something in the system 
needs serious repair.  Chapman’s lawyers noted that “[t]he public has an 
interest in the reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision that 
transcends the preferences of individual defendants.”208  But according to the 
Chapman Court, society’s interest in maintaining reliability and integrity in 
 
 204. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 41. 
 205. Id. 
 206. It is worth noting that I am not suggesting our judges and juries are fundamentally 
incapable of assessing motive or intent.  As Blume acknowledges, our system operates with a 
tolerable level of uncertainty in assigning criminal culpability, a task we entrust daily to judges 
and juries.  Blume, supra note 7, at 970.  I am simply suggesting that such assessments are 
inappropriate in this context.  In the normal criminal context, the finder of fact is asked to 
determine whether the defendant’s mental state reached a certain degree, such as malice 
aforethought.  Blume would ask the fact finder to separate and then compare two mental states 
that, I argue, may be inextricably linked. 
 207. Blume, supra note 7, at 973. 
 208. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 27 (citations omitted). 
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meting out capital punishment is sufficiently preserved by the procedural 
safeguards already in place: 
“[T]he required reliability is attained when the prosecution has discharged its 
burden of proof at the trial and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence 
and within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute[.] A 
judgment of death entered in conformity with these rigorous standards does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment reliability requirements.”209 
Here, the Kentucky Supreme Court was quoting from People v. Bloom,210 a 
California case, but it is interesting to note what the Court omitted between the 
ellipses.  Here is the full text of the quoted section: 
Rather, the required reliability is attained when the prosecution has discharged 
its burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of 
evidence and within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, the 
death verdict has been returned under proper instructions and procedures, and 
the trier of penalty has duly considered the relevant mitigating evidence, if 
any, which the defendant has chosen to present. A judgment of death entered 
in conformity with these rigorous standards does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment reliability requirements.211 
This highlights the biggest concern in Chapman’s case, which goes beyond 
competence: are the procedural safeguards doing enough to prevent abuse of 
the system?  For Chapman, there simply was no death verdict and no 
mitigating evidence was presented. 
Perhaps further procedural safeguards could limit a volunteer’s access to 
the court system for the purpose of committing suicide.  In a thorough, lucid 
article, Anthony Casey proposes balancing the interests of the state and 
interests of the inmate at different stages of capital proceedings.212  Casey 
would limit an inmate’s right to volunteer at stages where the state’s interest in 
fair and reliable application of the death penalty is at its highest, and the 
convict’s interest in having his just punishment carried out without 
unreasonable delay is at its weakest.213  The risks to the state’s interest in not 
convicting an innocent person or not convicting a person insufficiently 
culpable is too high at the trial and sentencing stages to allow a defendant to 
plead guilty or waive the presentation of mitigating evidence.214  As time 
passes after conviction and sentencing, the balance tips in favor of the 
 
 209. Chapman, 2007 WL 2404429, at *9 (quoting People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 719 (Cal. 
1989)). 
 210. 774 P.2d 698. 
 211. Id. at 719 (emphasis added). 
 212. Casey, supra note 7, at 77. 
 213. Id. at 101–02. 
 214. Id. at 105. 
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defendant’s interest in humane and reasonably timely punishment.215  By that 
point, the state’s interests have been sufficiently protected by a full trial and 
sentencing proceedings which included mitigating and aggravating evidence, 
so the inmate should be allowed to waive post-conviction relief.216 
While a few states have in place procedural safeguards roughly equivalent 
to Casey’s proposal, Kentucky does not.217  Needless to say, the trajectory of 
Chapman’s case under such a regime may well have been vastly different.  
First, consider the evidence that Chapman may have been under the influence 
of drugs at the time of the crimes, that he was prone to dissociative states, and 
that he testified that he did not remember what happened on the night of the 
murders.218  It is not too far-fetched that a jury could have found that Chapman 
did not have the mental state required for first-degree murder. 
Moreover, the defense adduced substantial evidence of Chapman’s 
shockingly troubled background.  He was abused physically by both of his 
parents, abused sexually by his father, and he began drinking alcohol and using 
drugs as early as age eight.219  Chapman suffered from bipolar disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, dysthymic disorder, gender identity issues, and 
attempted suicide as a teenager.220  In addition to binge-drinking, Chapman 
abused drugs, including marijuana, LSD, heroin, cocaine, crack, and 
methamphetamine.221 A jury may have taken this evidence into account as 
mitigation, and perhaps would not have returned a death sentence in a proper 
sentencing hearing. 
In sum, Chapman’s case very easily could have turned out differently with 
stricter procedural checks in place.  Casey’s proposal is measured and sensible, 
and perhaps represents a practicable option for the opponents of volunteerism. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
However, the fact remains that Kentucky does not prevent capital 
defendants from waiving presentation of mitigating evidence so long as the 
defendant is competent.  Actually, of all the thirty-eight states that recognize 
capital punishment, only one state, New Jersey, mandates the presentation of 
mitigating evidence.222  Furthermore, just two states, New York and Arkansas, 
prohibit a defendant from pleading guilty to a capital crime.223  While almost 
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all states mandate appellate review of death penalty cases,224 this is small 
consolation to opponents of volunteerism, as higher standards of review favor 
leaving trial proceedings undisturbed and few sentences are likely to be 
overturned.  Additional procedural checks may indeed represent the best 
vehicle for “stopping the rush to the death house”225 since more elaborate 
standards of competence are unlikely to yield consistently more “favorable” 
results.  But the fact that so few states have erected barriers to volunteering 
(other than mandatory post-conviction appeals) evinces a general mood in 
favor volunteerism, or at least reluctance to change the system. 
Opponents of death row volunteerism thus have the immense task of 
changing the prevailing attitudes of lawmakers, judges, and the public.  For 
example, Blume’s two-pronged test is premised upon society’s general 
disapproval of suicide.226  Courts at least, and perhaps society in general, 
simply may not choose to think of volunteerism as a form of suicide, even for 
those convicts who clearly express a desire to commit “suicide by court.”227  
Perhaps the prevailing opinion, and arguably the belief implicit in a 
layperson’s lack of concern for the plight of a demonstrably guilty volunteer, is 
that if a person has committed a capital crime, then a suicidal motive coupled 
with a request for the state to hasten execution is actually a justifiable 
 
 224. Id. at 87–88. 
 225. See Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death House: Third-Party Standing in 
Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201 (1994). 
 226. Blume, supra note 7, at 946–47. 
 227. In Chapman’s case, for example, the Court simply rejected the notion that a defendant 
who pleads guilty to a capital crime is committing a form of suicide: 
We reject Chapman’s related contention that a defendant who pleads guilty in order to receive the 
death penalty is committing state-assisted suicide. As previously noted, any guilty plea in a 
capital case in which a defendant seeks to receive the death penalty must be closely scrutinized to 
ensure that it protects the constitutional rights of the defendant, as well as the Commonwealth’s 
interest in ensuring that the death penalty is not used to further a defendant's suicidal motives. 
That scrutiny negates the possibility that a defendant is using the capital punishment scheme as a 
method to commit suicide.  Thus, we refuse to issue a blanket holding that a competent 
defendant’s plea of guilty in which he seeks a legally permissible sentence devolves into an 
unconstitutional plea because the sentence sought by the defendant is death.  And our review of 
the record in this case, as demonstrated in this opinion, shows that Chapman’s plea was 
competently, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Furthermore, the death penalty is 
not a disproportionate sentence for Chapman’s heinous offenses. So Chapman’s plea is not an 
impermissible ‘suicide by court.’” 
Chapman v. Commonwealth, No. 2005–SC–70–MR, 2007 WL 2404429, at *13 (Ky. Aug. 23, 
2007). (citations omitted).  It is clear from the Court’s opinion on competence and its adopted 
standard that a suicidal motivation does not play into its determination of competence.  So, what 
the court is essentially saying is that asking for the state to put you to death is not suicide if you 
have committed a crime deserving of a death sentence (or at least if you have pled guilty to such a 
crime). 
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acceptance of the punishment he deserves, something quite distinct from 
suicide under other circumstances. 
While both Blume’s and Casey’s proposals merit serious consideration, 
one cannot consider either without plunging back into the philosophical debate 
over volunteering.  Each is viable only if you first accept that there should be 
some check on a death row convict’s freedom to choose his own destiny.  And 
perhaps this makes each proposal equally unlikely to make the leap from the 
pages of the law review to the pages of the legislative code or case reporter.  
On the scales of public opinion, how do you balance impartially the abstract, 
incorporeal interest of the state in maintaining consistency and reliability in 
death sentencing on one side, and the personal interest of the death row inmate 
in autonomy, self-determination, and dignity on the other side?  This is not 
because public sympathy will be with the condemned but because the victim’s 
family—too often the forgotten constituency in scholarship, yet undeniably the 
party for whom the public is most acutely concerned—often shares an identical 
interest with the inmate in accelerating the execution.228 
Entrenched as capital punishment is in states such as Kentucky, it is 
perhaps unrealistic to think that they would implement a comprehensive set of 
restrictions on volunteering such as the one Casey suggests.  At the very least, 
however, I would suggest the state’s interest in fair administration of the death 
penalty is simply too strong to allow a defendant to plead guilty to a capital 
crime with no adjudication of culpability on the merits.229  Casey’s analysis on 
this point is helpful: 
The entering of a plea of guilty removes the reasonable doubt burden and 
replaces it with a burden that normally falls around factual basis or factual 
foundation.  Furthermore the guilty plea eliminates the full presentation of 
evidence at trial. This has two effects. First, the establishment of guilt is based 
on a less rigorous proceeding. Second, a later review of the finding of guilt, 
such as on appeal, must be conducted without the benefit of a full trial record, 
rendering such a review less effective in assuring a certainty of guilt. The 
responsibility to ensure non-arbitrary application, if taken seriously, suggests 
that the burden of proof and presentation of evidence should be constant in all 
cases. Recognizing this, one court noted that public policy required the state to 
impose “the supreme penalty only when a jury of twelve has been convinced 
 
 228. Undoubtedly a significant bar to reforming any aspect of the death penalty is that 
supporting the rights of death row convicts to live longer does not play well with voters.  One can 
imagine a state legislator losing her seat because, according to the television attacks of her 
opponent, “She favors murderers over victims’ families.” 
 229. It is not clear how such a requirement would operate.  It is certainly not a simple 
solution, for in the volunteer context it would inevitably bump up against the right to self-
representation, among other constitutional issues. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused after a trial conducted 
with all the safeguards appropriate to such proceedings.”230 
Chapman’s case provides a clear illustration of this problem.  Perhaps allowing 
a defendant to seek and ultimately to receive death, even if he may not 
otherwise have been convicted of and sentenced for a capital offense, 
purchases his autonomy at too high a price and moves us dangerously close to 
legitimizing “suicide by court.” 
At the same time, Chapman’s case counsels us not to detach policy 
discussions about capital punishment from the real life devastation that capital 
murder leaves behind. Chapman himself seemed genuinely to regret his savage 
crimes, and so the court’s consent in his decision to submit to punishment 
without undue delay might have allowed him to retain a shred of dignity in 
death. The hope is, more importantly, that it afforded Carolyn Marksberry, 
Courtney Sharon, their family and friends some measure of finality and repose 




 230. Casey, supra note 7, at 96 (quoting State v. Watkins, 194 S.E.2d 800, 810 (N.C. 1973)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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